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ABSTRACT
As more and more users begin to use the cloud for their com-
puting needs, datacenter operators are increasingly pressed
to effectively allocate their resources among these client users.
Yet while much work has been done in this area, relatively
little attention has been paid to studying perhaps the ulti-
mate lever of resource allocation: pricing. Most data centers
today charge users by “bundling” heterogeneous resources
together in a fixed ratio and selling these bundles to their
clients. But bundling masks the fact that different users re-
quire different combinations of resources (e.g., CPUs, mem-
ory, bandwidth) to process their jobs. The presence of mul-
tiple resources in fact allows an operator to offer many differ-
ent types of pricing strategies, which may have different ef-
fects on its revenue. Moreover, to avoid user dissatisfaction,
operators must consider the impact of their chosen prices on
the fairness of the jobs processed for different users. In this
paper, we develop an analytical framework that accounts for
the fairness and revenue tradeoffs that arise in a datacenter’s
multi-resource setting and the impact that different pricing
plans can have on this tradeoff. We characterize the im-
plications of different pricing plans on various fairness met-
rics and derive analytical limits on the operator’s fairness-
revenue tradeoff. We then provide an algorithm to navigate
this tradeoff and compare the tradeoff points for different
pricing strategies on a data trace taken from a Google clus-
ter.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.2 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Installation Management—Pricing and resource
allocation
General Terms
Economics, Management
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Cloud Computing Resources
As Internet connectivity becomes ever more ubiquitous,
cloud computing is becoming an increasingly popular alter-
native to traditional computing paradigms [26]. This dra-
matic increase in demand has led to several research chal-
lenges: how should a datacenter allocate multiple shared
resources among users in a practical, scalable manner? The
research implications of this question range from develop-
ing an efficient method of routing client requests to different
datacenters, to allocating a certain amount of resources for
processing each job as it arrives at a particular datacenter.
In this work, we focus on an “infrastructure-as-a-service”
view of the cloud, in which the resources considered are raw
computing resources such as CPU time or memory.
When provisioning resources to users, datacenter opera-
tors must take into account the fact that multiple types of
resources are being allocated. For instance, users’ jobs re-
quire both CPU time and RAM, which are non-substitutable
resources: more RAM does not mitigate a need for CPU pro-
cessing time, and neither does more processing time signifi-
cantly lessen RAM requirements. This provisioning of multi-
ple resources thus introduces new challenges to the datacen-
ter operator’s resource allocation problem, which are only
beginning to be studied [11]. In this work, we consider the
consequences of multiple resource allocation on the prices
offered to datacenter users.
1.2 Pricing Objectives
As datacenters become ever more popular, many position
papers have argued for the need to research new pricing
mechanisms that can accommodate the competing objec-
tives of a datacenter operator [4, 26]. While the operator
of course wishes to maximize its revenue, its pricing policy
must also take into account the dynamic nature of user de-
mand: as users submit jobs to the datacenter, the operator
must be able to accommodate the influx of new jobs and
balance the needs of incoming users with those of users al-
ready in queue. We thus introduce a fairness dimension: to
avoid incurring user dissatisfaction, the datacenter operator
should allocate its resources so that each user can process
a fair, or equitable, number of jobs. Treating users fairly,
however, can in itself impact revenue. In this work, we in-
troduce an optimization framework that allows datacenter
operators to balance the revenue and fairness of its resource
allocation through setting prices for its computing resources.
The presence of multiple resources gives a datacenter op-
erator flexibility in offering different types of pricing plans.
In this work, we examine the implications of different pricing
schemes on the achieved fairness and revenue. We consider
three different pricing plans:
Bundled pricing: Bundled pricing assumes that opera-
tors group heterogeneous resources such as CPU time and
memory together and then sell this resource bundle to users.
For instance, Google’s Compute Engine sells virtual ma-
chines (VMs), each with a fixed CPU and memory capacity
[7]. Basic pricing policies for Amazon’s EC2 similarly offer
VM bundles [2]. Users are charged at a fixed unit rate per
VM; they are free to make use of all or part of each VM re-
source. For instance, a user with computationally intensive
jobs might not require the VM’s full RAM capacity, but will
need to purchase its use anyway.
Resource pricing: Under resource pricing, an opera-
tor charges users separate unit prices for each resource that
they use. Microsoft’s Windows Azure, for instance, charges
separate unit rates for CPU time and memory [14]. Unlike
bundled pricing, resource pricing does not charge users for
resources they do not use. One can, however, view resource
pricing as a form of bundled pricing, in which the bundles for
each user are customized to exactly fit that user’s resource
requirements. The price of each bundle is determined by the
unit prices of the different resources.
Differentiated pricing: In differentiated pricing, users
are allocated exactly as much of each resource as they re-
quire to process their jobs. Differentiated pricing differs from
resource pricing, however, in that the operator can freely de-
termine each user’s per-job cost, and is not constrained to
charge users by unit resource prices. While differentiated
pricing has not yet been introduced to the market, many
believe that it will be necessary in the future [16].
In addition to the three pricing plans introduced above,
one may take advantage of datacenters’ economies of scale by
introducing volume discounts into a pricing policy; Ama-
zon’s EC2 offers such a pricing plan, charging a lower unit
rate for users who purchase a large quantity of resources [2].
While some works have investigated the effects of volume
discounts, e.g., for contract users [3], none have done so in a
multi-resource context. In this work, we compare bundled,
resource, and differentiated pricing with volume discounts
in a mathematical framework that takes into account user
demand, operator revenue, and fairness across users.
While the pricing plans offered by specific operators have
been analyzed and compared [18, 23], we use a general model
to solve for an operator’s optimal prices. Our work is unique
in accounting for both the pricing of multiple resources and
the fairness of the resulting allocation. While other papers
have accounted for fairness by using game theory to model
user competition [19] or studying the strategy-proof prop-
erty [20], these works do not explicitly deal with the pres-
ence of multiple, non-substitutable resources. Works that
do consider multi-resource fairness, on the other hand, do
not include user pricing. Instead, operators are assumed to
allocate a certain number of jobs to users in a manner that is
both efficient, in terms of a large number of processed jobs,
and equitable, i.e., no user processes a disproportionately
high or low number of jobs [6, 11, 22].
1.3 Job Arrivals and Deadlines
Dynamic pricing has been perhaps the most common ap-
proach taken in the literature on pricing for cloud or data-
center computing. Some papers have investigated revenue-
maximizing prices [5, 27], while other models take into ac-
count such factors as job completion deadlines [24]. In an-
other variant, users’ willingness to pay and job prices vary
depending on a given job’s completion time [21]. For in-
stance, operators may give different price quotes to users as
a function of the completion time, and the user can select
from these quotes [10]. Such a formulation may be used to
maximize the long-term social surplus, defined in terms of
user utilities over time [13]. However, most of these works
do not take the presence of multiple resources into account.
Other works have proposed dynamic auctions, an approach
popular with grid computing [8, 17]. However, such mea-
sures, e.g., the spot pricing offered by Amazon’s EC2, have
been shown to be ineffective in practice [25].
In our work, we suppose that the datacenter operator op-
timizes its prices over a finite time horizon. We divide time
into discrete intervals, e.g., of one hour, and suppose that
users are allocated the use of a given resource (e.g., CPU)
for each particular interval.1 We then have two possibilities:
in the first, user demands could be the same during each
time interval. The operator can then compute its prices in
an offline optimization and simply offer those prices during
each interval. In the second, more realistic, scenario, users’
demands change over time, and the operator must change
its prices accordingly. Operators must then account for job
deadlines, so that users’ jobs complete in a time acceptable
to users. In the main body of this work, we consider the
first scenario of optimization in a single time interval; Ap-
pendix A shows how our work may be extended to account
for changes in user demand and job deadlines.
We begin developing our framework in Section 2 by ex-
amining users’ choices of how many jobs to submit, given
a set of offered prices. Section 3 then discusses bundled,
resource, and differentiated pricing in the context of users’
choices and derives expressions for the operator’s revenue.
In Section 4, we introduce a family of metrics to measure the
fairness under different pricing plans. We then characterize
the fairness-revenue tradeoff with these metrics and derive
algorithms for practically choosing prices at different points
on the tradeoff. Finally, in Section 5 we perform simulations
on a dataset from a Google cluster to compare the achieved
fairness and efficiency for different pricing plans and a range
of resource capacities and volume discounts. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper.
2. USER OPTIMIZATION
Suppose that a datacenter operator has multiple clients
(i.e., users), each of whom submits jobs to the datacenter.
Each job requires a certain amount of datacenter resources,
e.g., CPU time, memory, and bandwidth; we suppose, as is
often the case in practice, that these resources are not sub-
stitutable. We index the resources with the variable i, and
denote the amount of resource i required for each job by Rij ,
where j indexes the user type. Different types of users are
distinguished by the different resource requirements of their
jobs; in an extreme case, each user might submit jobs with
slightly different resource requirements and thus belong to
a distinct type. Multiple users could also be grouped to-
1If the time intervals are very short, this pricing is sometimes
called resource-as-a-service, i.e., the selling of individual re-
sources at very short time granularities [1].
gether into the same type, if their jobs have similar resource
requirements that we can approximate as being the same.
We fix the number of user types as n and the number of re-
sources as m. If users are grouped together into a few types,
then we could have n ≤ m; otherwise, in general we have
n ≥ m as there are many more user clients than types of
resources.
When deciding how many jobs to submit, users take into
account the prices set by the datacenter operator, which
yield a cost per job for each user j. The structure of this
pricing plan may vary; Section 3 introduces three different
ways (bundled, resource, and differentiated pricing) in which
the prices may be set. In all three pricing plans, each user
has a fixed per-job cost, which we denote as rj for user j.
This cost accounts for both the resource prices and the vol-
ume discounts, which are taken to be separate functions of
the amount of each resource required by the user. We pa-
rameterize the volume discount with a constant γ ∈ (0, 1]; if
a user requires Rijxj amount of resource i, where xj denotes
the number of jobs submitted by user j, then the user is
charged according to the discounted quantity Rγijx
γ
j . Thus,
a larger γ corresponds to a smaller volume discount, and
γ = 1 corresponds to no volume discount. Since the amount
of resources required is an affine function of the user’s de-
mand, we let rj denote the per-job cost with the volume
discount and separately account for the discounted xγj term.
Users derive utility from the number of jobs that the data-
center processes, but lose utility from the amount that their
jobs cost.2 We use xj to denote the number of jobs processed
for each user j, and use the function Uj(xj) to denote the
utility from these jobs. Since a user’s utility increases with
the number of jobs processed, we follow the economic prin-
ciple of diminishing marginal utility and assume that Uj is
a strictly increasing, concave function, expressed in units of
dollars. Subtracting the cost rjx
γ
j from the utility of pro-
cessing xj jobs, we find that each user j maximizes
Uj (xj)− rjx
γ
j . (1)
For simplicity, we assume that Uj is continuously differen-
tiable for xj > 0. We suppose that the users have sufficient
available cash to pay for any number of jobs xj , so long as
(1) is positive; for instance, enterprise users would meet this
requirement. Users thus have no explicit budget constraint;
they submit as many jobs as required to maximize (1) for a
given set of prices.
An example family of utility functions are the so-called
isoelastic functions
Uj(x) =
{
cj(1− αj)
−1x1−αj , αj ∈ (0, 1)
cj log(x) αj = 1
(2)
commonly used in economics [15]. In (2), αj parameterizes
the concavity of the utility function (i.e., quantifying the
degree of diminishing marginal utility) and cj > 0 is a pos-
itive constant that scales the utility level for user j. As αj
increases, Uj becomes more concave, and the user becomes
more price-sensitive since the cost term rjx
⋆
j
γ term becomes
more dominant.
We assume that the user receives zero utility if no jobs
are processed; this assumption may be enforced by taking
2We assume throughout that the operator sets prices so that
all submitted jobs can be processed with the resources avail-
able. “Submitted” and “processed” can thus be used inter-
changeably.
Uj(0) = 0. The maximizer x
⋆
j of (1) then satisfies
U ′j
(
x⋆j
)
= rjγx
⋆
j
γ−1
, (3)
where x⋆j , a function of the per-job price rj , denotes the
utility-maximizing number of jobs.
We assume that the operator chooses a value of γ such that
a solution to (3) exists, and that (1) has non-positive second
derivative at this value of x⋆j , ensuring that the solution is
indeed a maximum. Mathematically, the second derivative
condition may be expressed as
U ′′j
(
x⋆j
)
< γ(γ − 1)x⋆j
γ−2
rj . (4)
For instance, the isoelastic utility functions satisfy this con-
dition if γ > 1−αj . We can then show that user j’s demand
x⋆j is decreasing in rj . By differentiating (3), we find that
this rate of decrease is
x⋆j
′
(rj) =
γx⋆j
γ−1
U ′′j
(
x⋆j
)
+ γ(1− γ)x⋆j
γ−2rj
, (5)
which is negative if (4) holds.
3. PRICING DATACENTER JOBS
The presence of multiple datacenter resources allows the
datacenter operator to offer many different pricing plans,
each of which may be combined with volume discounts. In
Section 3.1, we discuss the three pricing plans introduced
in Section 1.2: bundled, resource, and differentiated pricing.
We incorporate these prices in the user-optimization frame-
work introduced in the previous section and then compare
the optimal prices and resulting revenue in Section 3.2.
3.1 Pricing Strategies
We first consider bundled pricing, in which the operator
groups different resources in a fixed ratio–for instance, 1
CPU and 2 GB of RAM might be grouped together as a
bundled resource. The operator can then charge users a
unit price per bundle of resources required for the user’s
jobs. We let bi denote the amount of each resource i =
1, . . . ,m in each bundle, and let p denote the per-bundle
price. Using the notation from Section 2 to describe users’
utility functions and per-job resource requirements, we find
that each user j requires
µj = max
i
(
Rij
bi
)
(6)
bundles in order to complete one job. To calculate the per-
job cost, we incorporate the volume discount introduced in
the previous section, parameterized by γ ∈ (0, 1]. The per-
job cost then becomes rj = µ
γ
j p. Moreover, the number
of bundles available is mini Ci/bi, where Ci denotes the ca-
pacity of resource i. Thus, the operator faces the resource
constraint
n∑
j=1
max
i
(
Rij
bi
)
x⋆j
(
µγj p
)
≤ min
i
Ci
bi
, (7)
where x⋆j
(
µγj p
)
denotes the user’s demand for jobs at price p,
given the bundle (b1, . . . , bm). The resulting revenue under
bundled pricing, ρb, may be expressed as
ρb = p
n∑
j=1
(
µjx
⋆
j
(
µγj p
))γ
. (8)
We next observe that ρb in (8) is a non-differentiable func-
tion of the amount of each resource i (i.e., bi) in the bundle;
thus, the operator will likely find it difficult to optimize over
the bi. Instead, it can fix these bi and simply optimize over
the unit price p. For instance, the bi might be chosen as
proportional to the resource capacities Ci, i.e., such that
for some constant b, b = Ci/bi for each resource i. In this
case, the user’s bundle requirement (6) is proportional to
her dominant share, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A user’s dominant share is the maximum
share of any resource allocated to the user. Thus, if a user
receives Rijx
⋆
j amount of each resource i, her dominant share
would be maxiRijx
⋆
j/bi, i.e., the bundle requirement (6)
multiplied by b.
In Section 4.2, we show that users’ dominant shares may be
used to define the fairness of their utilities received.
While bundled pricing is convenient for the operator in
the sense that only one price variable needs to be chosen,
bundled pricing may lead to wasted capacity. Since different
users’ jobs have different resource requirements, the ratio of
resources in each bundle will not in general match the ratio
of per-job resource requirements for a user. Thus, some users
may be forced to purchase excess capacity of some resources–
for instance, a user with a per-job requirement of 2 CPU
cores and 1 GB of RAM would need to purchase 4 CPU cores
and 1 GB of RAM for each job if the operator offered bundles
of 4 CPU cores and 1 GB of RAM. To avoid this wasted
capacity, which could potentially be sold to another user
with different resource requirements, an operator could offer
resource pricing, in which the unit price of each resource
is independently determined by the operator, and users are
permitted to purchase exactly as much of each resource as
they need to process their jobs.
In this pricing framework, we let pi denote the unit price
of each resource i, so that each user j’s per-job cost is rj =∑m
i=1 piR
γ
ij . Thus, the operator’s total revenue ρr is
ρr =
m∑
i=1
pi
n∑
j=1
(
Rijx
⋆
j
(
m∑
i=1
piRij
))γ
. (9)
The resource constraints, which require that the operator be
able to provide enough resources to each user, can then be
expressed as
n∑
j=1
Rijx
⋆
j ≤ Ci (10)
for each resource i. The left-hand side corresponds to the
sum of users’ required amounts of resource i, while the right
side is simply the capacity of resource i.
We next note that resource pricing may be viewed as a
form of bundled pricing in which the ratio of resources in
each bundle exactly matches that required by users. This
relationship between bundled and resource pricing suggests
that the operator can offer a third, even more customized
type of pricing–differentiated pricing, in which the oper-
ator not only allows users to receive only as much of each
resource as they need, but independently sets the prices of
these customized bundles. Thus, the operator can set a dif-
ferent per-bundle price pj for each user j. We suppose that
one bundle exactly equals the user’s resource requirements
for one job, so that the per-job cost rj = pj . The operator’s
revenue ρd under differentiated pricing is then
ρd =
n∑
j=1
pjx
⋆
j
(
pj
)γ
, (11)
and the resource constraints are exactly those under resource
pricing (10).
3.2 Comparing Pricing Plans
In this section, we compare the operator’s revenue under
the three pricing plans introduced in the previous section.
We suppose that for any of the three pricing plans, the op-
erator chooses the prices so as to optimize a given objec-
tive function of users’ per-job costs and demands, e.g., the
revenue (8,9,11). In Section 4.2, we define the fairness of
users’ utilities, which form another family of possible objec-
tive functions.
We first give sufficient conditions under which the objec-
tive value under bundled pricing is at most that under re-
source pricing:
Lemma 1. If Rij/bi for each user j is maximized by re-
source i = k, then the maximum objective function value
with bundling does not exceed the maximum objective with
unbundled resources.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that k = 1.
Each user’s per-job bundle requirement is then R1j/b1. Let
the optimal price with bundling be denoted by pb. Then if
the operator charges p1 = p
b/b1 for resource 1 and noth-
ing for any other resource, each user’s per-job cost without
bundling is R1jp
b/b1, which equals the cost with bundling.
Each user’s demand is solely determined by the price per
job, so each user demands the same amount of jobs with and
without bundling, and the resource constraints are satisfied.
Since the objective function can be written entirely in terms
of users’ per-job costs, the value of the objective function
is also unchanged. Thus, the maximum objective without
bundling is at least as much as that with bundling.
Given a set of resource requirements, a bundle always exists
that satisfies the requirements of Lemma 1–for instance, the
operator might simply set b1 to be extremely small. Such
a scenario, however, is somewhat artificial. If an operator
instead sets the ratio of resources in each bundle equal to
the ratio of resource capacities, then Lemma 1 holds if each
user has the same dominant resource, defined as follows:
Definition 2. A given user’s dominant resource is the
resource k which maximizes Rij/Ci over all resources i.
We thus have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Suppose that the ratio of resources in each
bundle is equal to the ratio of resource capacities. Then if
each user has the same dominant resource, the operator’s
maximum objective function value with bundling does not
exceed that without bundling.
Proof. If the amount of each resource i in the bundle is
bi, then there exists a constant B such that Bbi = Ci for
each resource i. Thus, the resource k maximizing Rij/Ci
also maximizes Rij/bi, and Lemma 1 applies.
Intuitively, one might expect a result of this type, as the
operator can choose only one price p under bundled pricing,
while it chooses m ≥ 1 resource prices pi under resource
pricing. We note, however, that in general the operator’s
revenue under bundled pricing may not be less than that
under resource pricing–under bundled pricing, users often
are required to purchase excess capacity, and the resulting
excess revenue may offset the operator’s decreased flexibility
in choosing prices. However, when comparing resource pric-
ing and differentiated pricing, we obtain a stronger result:
Proposition 1. If an operator prices jobs by unit prices
pi for each resource i, its maximum objective function value
does not exceed the optimal value under differentiated pric-
ing. If the matrix of resource requirements R has rank n,
then the optimal objective function value under differentiated
and resource pricing is the same.
Proof. Suppose that the optimal prices under resource
pricing are pi for each resource i. Let the differentiated
prices pj =
∑m
i=1 R
γ
ijpi, so that the price per job does not
change for any user. Then x⋆j , the user’s demand for jobs,
does not change either, as it depends solely on the per-job
cost. The objective function value under these differentiated
prices thus attains the maximum revenue under resource
pricing. Moreover, since the resource constraints depend
only on the number of jobs x⋆j , these differentiated prices
are a feasible solution.
If the matrix R has rank n, then the resource prices may
be set in such a way that the per-job cost for each user equals
that under differentiated pricing. Thus, since the objective
depends only on per-job costs, the optimal objective value
under resource and differentiated pricing is the same.
In general, a datacenter operator will have several more
clients than resources (i.e., m ≤ n)–the number of data-
center resources will generally be a small number, e.g., two
for CPU cores and memory. However, if we instead group
users into a few distinct types, then the m × n matrix of
resource requirements R may have rank n ≤ m.
4. FAIRNESS AND REVENUE
In this section, we examine a datacenter operator’s two
objectives: revenue and fairness. We first characterize the
operator’s revenue in Section 4.1, and then consider fairness
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 then constructs an optimization
framework that takes into account both revenue and fair-
ness. We derive bounds on the tradeoff between fairness
and revenue and give an algorithm that finds the optimal
prices for bundled, resource, and differentiated pricing at
various points on this tradeoff curve.
4.1 Revenue and Resource Constraints
From the previous section, we see that the operator’s rev-
enue may be expressed as
ρ =


p
∑n
j=1
(
µjx
⋆
j
(
µγj p
))γ∑m
i=1 pi
∑n
j=1
(
Rijx
⋆
j
(∑m
i=1 piRij
))γ∑n
j=1 pjx
⋆
j
(
pj
)γ (12)
for the bundled, resource, and differentiated pricing plans
respectively. Should the operator wish to maximize its rev-
enue, a natural approach would be to take the first derivative
of the revenue with respect to each price variable and set it
equal to zero. In this case, however, we can show that the
revenue is always decreasing in each price variable, assuming
that the utility function Uj is not too concave compared to
the cost rjx
⋆
j
γ . Intuitively, each user j’s total utility should
grow slowly enough with the prices so that the optimal de-
mand x⋆j is well-defined, yet grows sublinearly so that the
overall amount paid rjx
⋆
j
γ decreases with the prices |bfp.
Proposition 2. Revenue ρ is decreasing in price if, for
all users j,
0 < U ′′j
(
x⋆j
)
+ γrjx
⋆
j
γ−2
< γ2rjx
⋆
j
γ−2
, (13)
where rj denotes the per-job cost for user j and is an affine
function of the prices offered. For instance, the isoelastic
utility functions (2) satisfy these criteria if, as assumed in
Section 2, γ > 1− αj .
Proof. We take the first derivative of the revenue ρ with
respect to a price variable pk (which may correspond to any
of the three pricing plans) to obtain
∂ρ
∂pk
=
n∑
j=1
∂rj
∂pk
x⋆j (rj)
γ +
n∑
j=1
rj
∂rj
∂pk
γx⋆j
γ−1
x⋆j
′
(rj) .
Since x⋆j
′ < 0, this derivative is negative if, for each user j,
−x⋆j
′
>
x⋆j
γrj
.
We can then use (5) to obtain the equivalent condition
U ′′j > −γrjx
⋆
j
γ−2
,
which is the first inequality in (13). The second inequality
follows from our assumption of concavity (4) in Section 2.
If we assume isoelastic utility functions for each user, as
in (2), then (13) becomes
0 < −cjαjx
⋆
j
−αj−1 + γrjx
⋆
j
γ−2
< γ2rjx
⋆
j
γ−2
,
where x⋆j = (rj/cj)
1/(1−αj−γ). Thus, we find the condition
0 < −αjγ + γ < γ
2,
or equivalently 0 < 1 − αj < γ, which we have assumed to
hold in Section 2.
Thus, the operator can maximize its revenue by offering
the lowest possible prices compatible with its resource con-
straints, i.e., such that the resources required to process all
users’ jobs do not exceed the resource capacities. We next
show that if users have isoelastic utility functions (2), then
the amount of each resource required to process users’ de-
manded jobs is a decreasing function of the prices. The re-
source constraints thus impose a lower bound on the prices
offered; in fact, they define a convex set of the prices:
Lemma 2. The set {p | Rix
⋆(r(p)) ≤ Ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , n}
is convex, where r is a vector of the per-job price for each
user and p a vector of the prices chosen by the operator.
Moreover, Rix
⋆(r(p)) is decreasing in each price pk.
Proof. We consider only resource pricing; the result may
be similarly proved for bundled or differentiated pricing. It is
sufficient to show that x⋆j is a convex function of the prices
p for each user j; since Rix
⋆ is an affine combination of
convex functions, the lemma follows. We first differentiate
and find that
∂x⋆j
∂pk
=
γ
1
1−αj−γ
1− αj − γ
(
m∑
i=1
piRij
) αj+γ
1−αj−γ
Rkj < 0
since γ > 1 − αj by assumption. Upon differentiating a
second time, we find that
∂2x⋆j
∂pk∂pl
=
(αj + γ) γ
1
1−αj−γ
(1− αj − γ)
2
(
m∑
i=1
piRij
) 2αj+2γ−1
1−αj−γ
RkjRlj .
Thus, the second-derivative matrix of x⋆j equals RQR
T ,
where Q is a diagonal matrix with entries
Qjj = γ
1
1−αj−γ
αj + γ
(1− αj − γ)
2
(
m∑
i=1
piRij
) 2αj+2γ−1
1−αj−γ
.
A sufficient condition for the second-derivative matrix to be
positive semi-definite is then that
γ
1
1−αj−γ
αj + γ
(1− αj − γ)
2
(
m∑
i=1
piRij
) 2αj+2γ−1
1−αj−γ
> 0,
which holds for each user j.
We have thus shown that in order to optimize revenue, the
operator should offer the lowest prices possible. However,
in doing so the operator could inadvertently favor one user
over another, possibly introducing user dissatisfaction. For
instance, suppose that one user k requires a relatively large
amount of one resource l (e.g., this user runs extremely
computationally-intensive jobs and requires a large number
of CPU cores). Under resource pricing, the operator might
then increase the price pl of this resource slightly, in order to
offer much lower prices for the other resources while keeping
the total demand for resource l,
∑n
j=1Rljx
⋆
j
(∑m
i=1 Rijpi
)
,
beneath the capacity Cl. But in this scenario, user k would
then have a higher per-job cost
∑m
i=1Rikpi than other users,
and thus process a lower number of jobs and receive lower
utility Uj(x
⋆
j ) − rjx
⋆
j . In the next section, we explore ways
to limit inequality among users by measuring the fairness
resulting from a set of offered prices.
4.2 Fairness
When users submit jobs to the datacenter operator, they
are allocated a given amount of each resource, which suffices
for the job to be completed. Thus, the operator is perform-
ing a multi-resource allocation among users, as considered in
[6, 11]. In these works, the fairness of a resource allocation
is measured in terms of the number of jobs processed for
each user–users are assumed to receive utility not from the
resources allocated, but rather from the jobs that those re-
sources allowed them to complete. In our framework, since
users use utility functions to measure their utility from pro-
cessed jobs, we measure the fairness of the utility value re-
ceived (i.e., U j = Uj
(
x⋆j
)
− rjx
⋆
j
γ) by each user j, rather
than simply measuring the number of jobs processed for dif-
ferent users.
When measuring the fairness of a distribution, we con-
sider two factors: equitability and efficiency. Equitability
refers to the idea that users should receive equitable utility
values, e.g., instead of assigning prices so that one user pro-
cesses a much larger number of jobs and receives a higher
utility than another user. However, in some cases one can
increase a user’s utility level without significantly diminish-
ing other users’ utilities: a more unequal allocation can re-
sult in more efficiency, or a larger amount of total utility
across users. Following [11]’s exploration of this equitability-
efficiency tradeoff for multi-resource allocations, we utilize
the following fairness functions:
sgn(1− β)
(
n∑
j=1
U
1−β
j
) 1
β
(
n∑
j=1
U j
)λ+1− 1
β
, (14)
where β 6= 1 and λ respectively parameterize the equitabil-
ity and efficiency [12].3 The term
(∑n
j=1 U j
)λ
, a function
simply of the total utility across users, may be regarded
as the efficiency component of this fairness function; as |λ|
increases, the total utility is more heavily weighted in the
function. The remainder of the function, parameterized by
a factor β, measures the equitability of the utility distribu-
tion. This component is homogeneous in the total utility
value, and thus measures only the relative values of the util-
ities received by each user. We note that if λ = β−1 − 1,
then maximizing (14) is equivalent to maximizing
Fβ(p) =
1
1− β
n∑
j=1
U
1−β
j , (15)
where β > 0 parameterizes the type of fairness under con-
sideration. This fairness function corresponds to the well-
known α-fairness function with α = β; we thus observe that
as β grows, (15) becomes “more fair” [12].
We next show that when users have isoelastic utility func-
tions, the fairness function (15) becomes a weighted fairness
function of the number of jobs processed for each user. To
do so, we first note the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Given a set of prices p, then assuming users
choose their demand so as to maximize their isoelastic util-
ities (2),
U j =
(
γ
cj
) γ
1−αj−γ
(
γ
1− αj
− 1
)
r
1−αj
1−αj−γ
j
=
(
γ
1− αj
− 1
)
rjx
⋆
j
γ
. (16)
Thus, the utility received from each user equals the amount
paid rjx
⋆
j
γ , multiplied by a price-independent constant.
By choosing the prices to offer, the operator thus determines
both the number of jobs processed x⋆j as well as the coef-
ficient (γ/(1− αj)− 1) rj of x
⋆
j
γ in users’ total utility. If
γ = 1, this coefficient simply multiplies x⋆j , or the number
of jobs processed by user j.
The fairness functions (14) and (15) assume that all users
are equal, in the sense that the utility received by each
user is treated the same. However, in practice users are
heterogeneous–they each submit a distinct type of jobs to
the datacenter operator, with different resource requirements
and different utility functions. Thus, it may not be equitable
to treat all users equally. In Lemma 3, we account for users’
differing utility functions with the constant γ/(1− αj) − 1.
This constant weight is decreasing in αj ; thus, as a user be-
comes less price-sensitive (αj decreases), the weight in the
fairness function increases. More price-sensitive users tend
3These functions are the unique fairness functions satisfying
four desirable fairness axioms [12]. In Appendix C, we con-
sider two additional properties (envy-freeness and Pareto-
efficiency) that are not axiomatically satisfied.
to receive lower utility values for the same number of jobs
due to lower values of αj in their utility functions (2), an
effect that is offset with this weight.
By examining the value of the per-job cost rj for bun-
dled, resource, and differentiated pricing, we can gain fur-
ther insight into the interpretation of fairness for each of
these pricing plans. Under bundled pricing, we find that
rj = µ
γ
j p. Supposing that the ratio of resources in each
bundle equals the ratio of resource capacities, we see from
(6) that µjx
⋆
j is simply user j’s dominant share; thus, if
there is no volume discount (γ = 1), then the fairness weight
(γ/(1− αj)− 1) rj is simply the price p multiplied by 1/(1−
αj)−1 and the user’s dominant share. Thus, the fairness on
users’ utility values can be viewed as a (weighted) fairness on
the amount of resources required by each user. Users whose
jobs have larger resource requirements (larger µj) may thus
process fewer jobs–their jobs require more of the limited re-
sources, thus detracting from other users’ jobs. This fairness
on dominant shares metric has been previously proposed for
general allocations without pricing [6, 11].
If we instead consider differentiated pricing, we note that
the weight (γ/(1− αj)− 1) rj = (γ/(1− αj)− 1) pj in (16)
is completely determined by the operator; users’ resource
requirements only enter into the choice of pj through the
demand functions x⋆j . This pricing scheme thus corresponds
to a fairness function that does not as explicitly account for
resource requirements.
Under resource pricing with no volume discount, we ob-
tain a fairness metric that lies between the fairness with
bundled and differentiated pricing. With resource pricing,
we see from (16) that each x⋆j ’s weight in the fairness func-
tion (14) becomes (γ/(1− αj)− 1)
∑m
i=1 piRij . Thus, the
number of jobs is multiplied by a constant depending on αj ,
multiplied by a weighted sum of a user’s resource require-
ments. Users with higher resource requirements will thus
process fewer jobs. However, unlike bundled pricing’s domi-
nant shares, the exact weight for each resource is determined
by its price, which may be seen as a proxy for how “valu-
able” different resources are. More valuable resources will
have higher prices and thus yield higher weights.
4.3 Fairness-Revenue Tradeoffs
A datacenter operator wishes to optimize both revenue
and fairness. In this section, we consider a weighted sum of
the revenue (12) introduced in Section 4.1 and the fairness
(15) introduced in Section 4.2:
νρ(p) + Fβ (p) (17)
where ν > 0 is the weight parameter determining the opera-
tor’s relative emphasis on fairness or revenue. By optimizing
a weighted sum of revenue and fairness, the operator can op-
timize both its revenue and the fairness of users’ resulting
utility distribution. We consider users with isoelastic utility
functions (2) and show that, when the revenue weight ν is
sufficiently small, this optimization problem becomes con-
vex. While this result indicates that an operator can more
easily optimize fairness, possibly leading to a loss in rev-
enue, we can adapt the proof of Lemma 3 to show that this
tradeoff is limited.
We first derive conditions on the weight ν under which
maximizing (17) subject to the resource constraints is a con-
vex optimization problem:
Data: Parameters αj , ν, and γ, tolerance ǫ > 0, update
parameter µ > 1.
Result: Optimized resource prices.
Initialize t← 1;
while t < m/tol do
Find p⋆k(t) satisfying ft(p) =
−tν∇ρ(p) − t∇Fβ(p) +
∑m
i=1
−∇x⋆(p)Ri
T
Rix
⋆(
∑m
i=1
piRij)−Ci
= 0
where k indexes the number of solutions;
Choose k such that p⋆k(t) minimizes ft(p) =
−tνρ(p)− t∇Fβ(p)−
∑m
i=1 log
(
−Rix
⋆
(∑
m
i=1 piRij
)
+ Ci
)
;
Update p← p⋆k(t);
Update t← µt;
end
Algorithm 1: Interior-point optimization of (17).
Proposition 3. Suppose that β > 1 and that
0 ≤ ν ≤
(
γ + αj − 1
1− αj
)1−β
γ
βγ
αj+γ−1
−1(
β(1− αj)− γ
)
×

max
i
(
Ci
Rij
) β(αj−1)
γ


for all users j. Then (17) is a concave function of the prices
and, by Lemma 2, maximizing (17) subject to the resource
constraints is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. See Appendix B.
If ν satisfies Prop. 3’s conditions, standard convex opti-
mization solvers may be employed to solve for the optimal
prices. Even when ν is larger than the bound given, however,
we can adapt these algorithms to find the optimal prices, as
shown in Algorithm 1 for the interior-point algorithm. Intu-
itively, the interior point algorithm starts from a set of prices
p and then uses Lagrange multipliers on the problem con-
straints to iterate the values of p so as to increase the objec-
tive while remaining within the problem constraints. In our
case, differentiating Fβ for β > 1 shows that the objective
(17) is decreasing in each price variable–thus, intuitively, the
operator searches for the lowest feasible prices. Using this
intuition, one can adapt standard proofs of convergence for
the interior-point algorithm to show the following:
Proposition 4. Algorithm 1 converges to a price vector
p maximizing the objective (17).
In the case of only one resource, the lowest feasible price for
this resource is the price for which the resource constraint
is tight; by Lemma 2, since the demands x⋆j are decreasing
in the price variables, a unique price exists satisfying this
property. Thus, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Suppose that the operator offers a bundled
pricing plan. Then its objective (17) for any revenue weight
ν is maximized at the lowest feasible price, which is the zero
of the bundled resource constraint
∑n
j=1 pµ
γ
j x
⋆
j (p)
γ = 1.
We finally note that Algorithm 1 holds only for fixed vol-
ume discounts γ. However, if the operator’s optimization
problem is convex, as in Prop. 3, then the optimal prices
for each γ can be determined efficiently. The operator can
then perform a line search to determine the optimal volume
discount. Section 5.3 numerically characterizes the achieved
fairness and revenue for different volume discounts.
The upper bound on the revenue weight ν in Prop. 3 raises
some concern that the operator may overly weight fairness
and consequently lose revenue. However, when users have
isoelastic utility functions, we can in fact bound the achieved
revenue in terms of the achieved fairness when the fairness
parameter β > 1; thus, even if the fairness term in (17)
dominates the revenue term, the operator’s revenue is still
lower-bounded away from zero. Moreover, if β < 1, a class of
fairness measures not included in Prop. 3, then the achieved
fairness can be lower-bounded in terms of the achieved rev-
enue. Thus, emphasizing fairness in the operator’s objective
need not lead to a significant loss of either revenue or of the
fairness measured by metrics besides those in Prop. 3.
Proposition 5. Suppose that β > 1. The revenue ρ (p)
can then be lower-bounded in terms of the achieved fairness
(15):
ρ(p) ≥
(
Fβ(p)(1− β)
) 1
1−β
n∑
j=1
1− αj
γ + αj − 1
.
On the other hand, if β < 1, then the fairness value Fβ(p)
may be lower-bounded in terms of the achieved revenue:
Fβ(p) ≥
ρ (p)1−β
1− β
(
γ
1− αk
− 1
)1−β
,
αk = maxj αj . Intuitively, a lower value of β more empha-
sizes efficiency: λ = 1/β − 1 in (14) is increasing in β. By
Lemma 3, the efficiency, or total utility received, is simply
a scalar multiple of the revenue. A higher β, on the other
hand, gives more emphasis on fairness, and thus cannot be
lower-bounded by the revenue.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we use a six-hour workload trace from a
Google cluster to illustrate the effects of resource capacity
and volume discounts on a datacenter operator’s achieved
revenue and fairness for different pricing plans [9]. In par-
ticular, we find that increasing resource capacity allows im-
provements in both fairness and revenue, but that these re-
sults are highly dependent on the heterogeneity of the users’
resource requirements. Varying the volume discount offered
allows an increase in fairness, but results in decreased rev-
enue and more leftover resources under resource and differ-
entiated pricing. We find that for a range of resource ca-
pacities and volume discounts, all three pricing plans yield
comparable revenues, but differentiated pricing permits a
significantly higher fairness.
Our workload trace includes 9218 jobs divided into 176580
tasks; each task runs on a single machine within the cluster.
The amount of memory (RAM) and fractional number of
CPU cores taken up by each active task was recorded at five-
minute intervals over 6 hours; these measurements were then
passed through a linear transformation to ensure anonymity.
For this reason, we omit units in our discussion here. We add
each job’s resource usage over all the time intervals recorded
to find an average per-job CPU usage of 0.136 and memory
usage of 0.182.
The jobs in the Google trace show a large variation in
resource usage; the CPU and memory usage distributions
have respective standard deviations of 13.4 and 18 times
their means. To simplify our simulations, we exclude jobs
whose total usage of either CPU or memory lies more than
one standard deviation away from the mean. We then use
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Figure 1: Jobs in the Google trace, clustered based on the
total CPU cores and memory used in a 6-hour interval.
k-means clustering to group jobs into three different clusters
or types by their CPU and memory usage. Figure 1 shows
the resulting clusters of jobs; we ran 30 instances of the k-
means algorithm and chose the result minimizing the intra-
cluster distance. We take the k-means centroid points to
be the resource requirements of each job type: type 1 jobs
require 0.4 CPUs and 2.7 units of memory, while type 2 jobs
require only 0.01 units of CPU and 0.02 units of memory
and type 3 jobs require 0.6 units of CPU and 0.5 units of
memory. We associate a user type with each type of job and
assume that these users have isoelastic utility functions (2),
with parameters cj = 1 and αj = 0.4, 0.7, 0.5 for j = 1, 2, 3
respectively. Taking the capacity of each resource to be 6
units, the operator’s objective (17) then becomes:
max
p
νρ(p) + Fβ(p) (18)
s.t. {0.4x⋆1 + 0.01x
⋆
2 + 0.6x
⋆
3 , 2.7x
⋆
1 + 0.02x
⋆
2 + 0.5x
⋆
3} ≤ 6,
where p is the vector of prices offered for either bundled, re-
source, or differentiated pricing. For scalability, we suppose
that there are 10 users, with 1 user each of types 1 and 3
and 8 users of type 2.
We first consider the effects of resource capacity on the op-
erator’s revenue and fairness in Section 5.1, and then show
that these tradeoffs can change dramatically with the distri-
bution of users (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 then considers the
effects of volume discounts. Throughout our discussion, we
take the fairness parameter β in (18) to be relatively large,
at β = 20; this choice of β allows us to approximate max-min
fairness, i.e., maximizing the minimum utility value. Larger
values of β thus impose a stricter fairness requirement than
lower ones, and have been used previously as fairness bench-
marks in multi-resource allocation [6, 11].
5.1 Resource Capacity
We first examine the effect of the available capacity on
the operator’s achieved revenue and fairness. We vary the
memory capacity from 1/3 to 8 and use the interior-point
algorithm (cf. Algorithm 1) to solve for the optimal values
of the bundled, resource, and differentiated prices for differ-
ent revenue weights ν in (18). Figure 2 shows the achieved
revenue and fairness for each pricing plan. As the memory
capacity increases in Fig. 2, the operator’s fairness and effi-
ciency under each pricing plan both improve: the operator
has more memory to allocate, and thus more flexibility in
setting the prices. Mathematically, we see that one con-
straint in the optimization problem (18) has been relaxed,
allowing the operator to increase the value of its objective
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Figure 2: Achieved fairness and revenue for a range of revenue weights ν in (18) and memory capacities. On each contour
(individual contours only visible for differentiated pricing), ν is fixed and the capacities are varied. For differentiated pricing,
the contours reveal a range of tradeoffs for each fixed capacity and varied weight ν.
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Figure 3: Utility received by the three user types as the RAM (memory) capacity varies for maximum fairness or revenue.
function. We note that, as expected from Corollary 2, the
achieved revenue and fairness do not change with ν for bun-
dled pricing. The optimal bundled price, which maximize
both revenue and fairness, is simply the lowest price consis-
tent with the operator’s resource constraint.
We next compare resource (Fig. 2b) and differentiated
(Fig. 2c) pricing. Though differentiated pricing adds only
a single additional price variable, it results in a significantly
larger fairness for the operator, especially at low memory
capacities. Moreover, varying the revenue weight ν results
in a much richer set of tradeoffs between fairness and rev-
enue for differentiated, rather than resource, pricing. This
result may reflect the large heterogeneity in users’ resource
requirements: while both type 1 and type 2 users require
a very large amount of memory relative to their CPU re-
quirements, type 2 users require significantly less memory
and fewer CPUs than type 1 users. If the operator offers
resource pricing, type 1 users are then very affected by the
memory price, and their utility will be adversely impacted
by an increase in this price. In fact, type 1 and type 3 users
also require more CPUs per job than type 2 users, so their
utility levels will also be adversely impacted by increases in
the CPU price. At the same time, type 2 users will process
many jobs due to their jobs’ relatively low resource require-
ments cost, allowing the operator to extract more revenue
from type 2 users. Under differentiated pricing, the opera-
tor can manipulate the prices of individual users to remove
these constraints imposed by resource heterogeneity, allow-
ing the operator to increase the fairness across users without
a large decreases in revenue.
We can validate the above explanation of the operator’s
low achieved fairness for bundled and resource pricing by
calculating the utility received by each user under the three
pricing plans. Figure 3 shows the utility values for each
user when only fairness is optimized (i.e., ν = 0 in (18)),
and when only revenue is optimized (ν → ∞). We see that
type 2 users receive more utility than users of types 1 or 3;
since type 2 users have far smaller resource requirements,
this result is unsurprising. Users 1 and 3, however, receive
almost the same utility under bundled and resource pricing,
which is much less than that under differentiated pricing.
As the capacity increases, however, their utility levels un-
der resource pricing become visibly larger than those under
bundled pricing, corroborating Fig. 2’s higher fairness val-
ues under resource, rather than bundled, pricing.
5.2 User Heterogeneity
We next examine whether the dramatic changes in fairness
for different pricing plans is still observed when users are less
heterogeneous. We vary the fraction of type 1 and type 2
users varies (we fix the fraction of type 3 users to be 10%)
and fix the memory capacity to be 6 units. Figure 4 shows
the resulting fairness and revenue tradeoffs; we see that a
visible range of tradeoffs exists for both resource and differ-
entiated pricing, and that the fairness for different revenue
weights ν is much less negative than in Fig. 2. As the frac-
tion of type 1 users increases, the revenue decreases under all
pricing plans: type 1 users require more resources than type
2 users, so the operator receives more revenue from using
its available resources to process type 2 users’ jobs. Under
bundled pricing, the fairness also increases with the fraction
of type 1 users; all type 1 users receive the same (lower than
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Figure 4: Achieved fairness and revenue for a range of revenue weights ν and distribution of user types. On each contour
(individual contours not visible in (a)), the weight ν is fixed and the fraction of type 1 users varies. For (b) resource and (c)
differentiated pricing, the contours reveal a range of tradeoffs for each distribution of user types and varied revenue weights ν.
type 2) utility values, increasing equitability. Under resource
or differentiated pricing, however, increasing the fraction of
type 1 users decreases the fairness. To achieve a higher rev-
enue, the operator processes more jobs from type 2 users,
even when more type 1 users are present.
As expected from Corollary 2, varying the revenue weight
ν has no effect on the utility or revenue from bundled pric-
ing. Under resource or differentiated pricing, however, as the
revenue weight ν increases in Fig. 4, the operator’s revenue
increases for any given fraction of type 1 users. However,
this increase in revenue results in a decrease in fairness: in
particular, when a low fraction of users is present in resource
pricing (e.g., the leftmost contour in Fig. 4b), the revenue
barely increases, while the fairness drops steeply as ν in-
creases. We can explain this result by examining the utility
received by each user for different fractions of type 1 users,
as shown in Fig. 5.
We see from Fig. 5 that as the fraction of type 1 users
increases, the minimum utility over all three users also de-
creases, though type 2 and type 3 users actually receive more
utility under bundled and resource pricing when the revenue
is maximized. This is offset, however, by a decrease in utility
for type 1 users, which results in a decrease in the minimum
utility across users. This result likely comes from the fact
that type 1 users require more resources to process their
increased number of jobs, as the fraction of type 1 users in-
creases. For bundled pricing, however, the minimum utility
increases when either revenue or fairness is maximized, likely
because type 1 users, who had previously received lower util-
ities than type 2 or 3 users, could now process more jobs.
When fewer type 1 users are present, the price of type 1
users’ jobs under resource or differentiated pricing may be
set so that these users receive slightly higher utility values;
since there are relatively few type 1 users, they do not take
away many resources from the other types of users.
5.3 Volume Discounts
We conclude by examining a parameter set by the oper-
ator: the volume discount γ. Figure 6 shows the fairness-
revenue tradeoffs for a range of volume discounts γ.
We see that for both bundled and resource pricing, vary-
ing ν in the operator’s objective function (18) does not yield
an appreciable tradeoff (for bundled pricing, this result is
again Corollary 2). Moreover, as γ decreases, the fairness
decreases quite rapidly under both these pricing plans; once
the revenue exceeds 50, the fairness value decreases exponen-
tially. Differentiated pricing allows a wider range of much
higher fairness values. As the revenue weight ν increases
from 0, the revenue under differentiated pricing increases
rapidly, while the range of achieved fairness stays roughly
the same; though each contour represents a linear increase
in ν, the resulting increase in revenue, measured by the “dis-
tance” between the contours, is very pronounced. As ν in-
creases further, the contours grow closer together, but the
range of achieved fairness decreases more rapidly.
For larger revenue weights ν, we find that the operator’s
revenue decreases with γ for all three pricing plans, as a re-
sult of decreased demand from users. This demand decrease,
however, affects users in different ways and acts to increase
fairness. When ν = 0 under differentiated pricing, the rev-
enue does not decrease monotonically with γ; for a small
volume discount (γ near 1), the revenue initially increases
and then decreases with γ. Unlike our results for varied
memory capacities or distributions of users (Figs. 2 and 4),
the differentiated pricing contours for different ν actually
overlap: the operator can achieve the same combination of
fairness and revenue by optimizing two different weighted
sums of fairness and revenue while offering different volume
discounts.
We can explain the very negative fairness values observed
in Figs. 6a and 6b for bundled and resource pricing by
examining the equitability and efficiency components of the
fairness function (15). We see that the equitability is quite
negative, even for differentiated pricing, where the fairness
values are relatively moderate (Fig. 6c). Thus, the very low
fairness values observed in Fig. 6 may be attributed more to
lack of equitability in the utilities received by different users
rather than a low total utility.
The relatively low efficiency values observed in Fig. 7
lead us to consider another measure of efficiency: leftover
resource capacity. Though leftover capacity is not explic-
itly accounted for in the user’s optimization problem (18)–
capacity only enters through the resource constraints–the
leftover capacity may indicate the potential additional rev-
enue that an operator could achieve, e.g,. if users’ demand
functions change due to different volume discounts offered.
We find that for all volume discounts γ and weights ν, only
CPU cores are leftover; as the revenue increases, the leftover
capacity increases for both resource and differentiated pric-
ing. Thus, a volume discount reduces the “wasted” capacity
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Figure 5: Utility received by the three user types as the fraction of type 1 and 2 users varies, maximum fairness or revenue.
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(c) Differentiated pricing.
Figure 6: Achieved fairness and revenue for a range of revenue weights ν and volume discounts γ. On each contour (individual
contours only visible for differentiated pricing), ν is fixed and γ varies. For (a) bundled and (b) resource pricing, the optimal
fairness and revenue values do not change significantly with ν. For (c) differentiated pricing, the contours reveal a range of
tradeoffs for each fixed γ and varied ν.
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Figure 7: Equitability and efficiency components of the fair-
ness function (15) as the revenue weight ν varies in the op-
erator’s objective function (18).
by increasing user demand and operator revenue. For bun-
dled pricing, however, we have the opposite scenario: as the
revenue and overall user demand increase, the leftover capac-
ity also increases. With bundled pricing, users are forced to
purchase excess capacity according to the ratio of resources
in the resource bundle. As the volume discount increases,
user demand goes up and users purchase more excess capac-
ity, which is included in the leftover capacity shown in Fig.
7. This result thus highlights the “inefficiency” inherent in
forcing users to pay for resources they do not need.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we develop a mathematical framework for
evaluating three cloud pricing strategies–bundled, resource,
Figure 8: Leftover CPU capacity versus achieved revenue
as the volume discount γ and revenue weight ν vary in the
operator’s objective function (18).
and differentiated pricing–in terms of their resulting fair-
ness and revenue. We first characterize user demand for
resources as a function of the prices offered under these dif-
ferent pricing plans, and then find the resulting revenue. We
next formulate a family of metrics to measure the fairness
of the offered prices and analyze the tradeoff between fair-
ness and revenue. After showing some analytical bounds on
this tradeoff, we finally use data taken from a Google cluster
to numerically evaluate the impact of resource capacity and
volume discounts on the operator’s fairness-revenue trade-
off. We find that differentiated pricing, even if it only adds
one additional price variable compared to resource pricing,
can significantly increase the fairness under bundled or re-
source pricing, though revenue remains comparable across
all pricing strategies. The operator can also increase both
fairness and revenue through an increase in resource capac-
ity, but the magnitude of this benefit depends heavily on
the heterogeneity of users’ resource requirements. Finally, a
lower volume discount can be used to increase fairness, but
at a loss of some revenue and increase in unused resource
capacity.
Throughout this work, we consider fairness and revenue
solely in terms of prices. A real implementation, however,
would allow us to explore a different aspect of fairness: user
priorities. Instead of choosing prices so as to balance fair-
ness and revenue, an operator could instead leverage the
temporal dimension of job processing in datacenters to or-
thognalize an operator’s desire for fairness with its incen-
tive to increase revenue. Users receiving lower utility values
could be compensated with higher priorities, allowing their
jobs to be completed faster. By implementing such a pri-
oritized allocation scheme and devising algorithms for com-
puting these priorities, we can evaluate whether setting user
priorities, choosing job prices under one of many possible
pricing plans, or a combination of both is most effective at
balancing a datacenter operator’s competing objectives of
maximizing revenue and fairness.
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APPENDIX
A. INTRODUCING DEADLINES
In this section, we show that our formulation in Sections 2
- 4 may be altered to allow changes in user utilities and job
demands over multiple time intervals. In formulating this
problem, we account for varying job deadlines: users specify
a completion deadline when a job is submitted, and the op-
erator takes these into account when setting prices for each
time interval. We suppose that the operator sets different
prices in each time interval; then if the price optimization
for the single interval is convex (e.g., as in Prop. 3), so is
the optimization over prices in all time intervals. We derive
this extension only for resource pricing, but similar methods
can be used for bundled or differentiated pricing.
We suppose that when users submit jobs to the datacen-
ter operator in each time interval, they specify the maxi-
mum time to complete these jobs as well as the job resource
requirements that, if met, will ensure that the job is com-
pleted before the deadline. We suppose that it does not
matter when a user receives the requested resources, so long
as the resources are allocated in the requested ratio. For
instance, a job with a deadline of three time intervals and
a requirement of 6 CPU slots and 3 GB of RAM might be
allocated 2 slots and 1 GB in each time interval; or 2 slots
and 1 GB in the first, no resources in the second, and 4 slots
and 2 GB in the third time interval; either allocation allows
the job to complete before the deadline. In each time in-
terval, each user submits one type of job to the datacenter
(i.e., Rij is the same for all jobs of user j and all resources i
submitted during a given time interval). If a user has mul-
tiple types of jobs to run, these may be treated as coming
from distinct users. One could also group users with similar
per-job resource requirements.
We consider a finite time horizon of T time intervals, in-
dexed by s = 1, 2, . . . , T , and assume that all job deadlines
fall before the final time T . At the beginning of each time
interval s, the operator sets the resource prices pi,s for each
resource i; denoting the vector of resource prices in period
s by ps, each user j then submits x
⋆
j,s(ps) number of jobs
to the operator, with associated deadline τj,s. These jobs
are charged according to the price ps, though the resource
prices may change before the job completes. Users choose
the number of jobs so as to maximize their utility in period
s, and do not account for any jobs that have been already
submitted or may be submitted in future periods. For sim-
plicity, we suppose that for each user j, all of user j’s jobs
submitted in a given period s have the same deadline.
We now introduce the variables xj,s(t), s < t, to denote
the number of jobs submitted by user j in period s that are
processed during time interval t. To ensure that all deadlines
are met, we introduce the constraints
τj,s∑
t=s
xj,s(t) ≥ x
⋆
j,s(ps) (19)
for each user j and time interval s; since x⋆j,s is convex in
the prices ps by Lemma 2, this constraint defines a convex
set. The resource constraints for each period t then become
t∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
Rij(s)xj,s(t) ≤ Ci, (20)
where Rij(s) denotes the per-job requirement of resource i
for jobs submitted by user j in the time interval s. We note
that these constraints are affine in the variables xj,s(t); thus,
the constraints (19) and (20) together define a convex set in
the variables ps and xj,s(t). We then find that the revenue
with deadlines may be expressed as
T∑
s=1
(
n∑
j=1
x⋆j,s
γ
m∑
i=1
Rij(s)pi,s
)
. (21)
The fairness may be thought of as the sum of the fairness
of the utilities received in each time interval; the fairness
function is thus only indirectly dependent on the deadlines
τj,s. Users specify the deadlines independent of the prices
offered, so these should not affect their perceived utility or
fairness. Thus, (15) yields the fairness function
1
1− β
T∑
s=1
(
n∑
j=1
U j
(
x⋆j,s(ps),ps
)1−β)
. (22)
We note that since both the revenue (21) and fairness (22)
are simply the revenue and fairness in each time interval
s added together, we may apply Prop. 3 to formulate a
weighted sum (with weights possibly depending on the time
interval) of both the revenue and fairness that is a concave
function. We then have the following result:
Proposition 6. The optimization problem
max
xj,s(t),pi,s
T∑
s=1
ν(s)
(
n∑
j=1
x⋆j,s
γ
m∑
i=1
Rij(s)pi,s
)
+
1
1− β
(
n∑
j=1
U j
(
x⋆j,s(ps),ps
)1−β)
(23)
s.t.
t∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
Rij(s)xj,s(t) ≤ Ci; 1 ≤ t ≤ T ; 1 ≤ i ≤ m
(24)
τj,s∑
t=s
xj,s(t) ≥ x
⋆
j,s(ps); 1 ≤ s ≤ T ; 1 ≤ j ≤ n
(25)
is a convex optimization if, for each time interval s, the
weight ν(s) is chosen so as to satisfy Prop. 3 for the revenue
and fairness in period s.
B. PROOFS
B.1 Proposition 3
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we show the result
for resource pricing; the proofs for bundled or differentiated
pricing are analogous. We first note that the second deriva-
tive matrix of (17) may be written as
ν∇2ρ+∇2Fβ =
[
R
γ
ij
]
Q
[
R
γ
ij
]T
,
where Q is a diagonal matrix with entries
Qjj = ν (γrj(p))
2γ+αj−1
1−αj−γ γ2
1− αj
(1− αj − γ)
2
+ γ
(1−β)γ
1−αj−γ
(
γ + αj − 1
1− αj
)
−β
β(1− αj)− γ
1− αj − γ
× r
(−1−β)(1−αj )+2γ
1−αj−γ
j
and
[
R
γ
ij
]
is an m × n matrix with (i, j) entry Rγij . A
sufficient condition for this second-derivative matrix to be
negative-semidefinite is that Qjj < 0 for each j. Thus, we
find the condition
ν ≤
(
γ + αj − 1
1− αj
)1−β
γ
βγ
αj+γ−1
−1(
β(1− αj)− γ
)
× (rj)
β(1−αj )
αj+γ−1 .
. We can remove the price variables from this bound by
observing that the resource constraints Rx⋆ ≤ C imply that
Rijr
γ
1−αj−γ
j ≤ Ci
for each resource i and user j; thus,
r
β(1−αj)
αj+γ−1
j ≥ max
i
(
Ci
Rij
) β(αj−1)
γ
.
We therefore find the sufficient condition
ν ≤
(
γ + αj − 1
1− αj
)1−β
γ
βγ
αj+γ−1
−1(
β(1− αj)− γ
)
×

max
i
(
Ci
Rij
) β(αj−1)
γ

 .
B.2 Proposition 5
Proof. Suppose that β < 1 in (15). We first introduce
the notation
νj =
γ + αj − 1
1− αj
=
γ
1− αj
− 1,
and find that the fairness may be written as
1
1− β
n∑
j=1
ν1−βj
(
γ
cj
) γ(1−β)
1−αj−γ
r
(1−αj )(1−β)
1−αj−γ
j
≥
minj ν
1−β
j
1− β
(
n∑
j=1
(
γ
cj
) γ
1−αj−γ
r
1−αj
1−αj−γ
j
)1−β
=
ρ (p)1−β
1− β
(
γ
1− αk
− 1
)1−β
.
The first inequality uses the sub-additivity of the function
f(x) = x1−β , and we let k be such that αk = minj αj .
We now suppose that β > 1 and find that for each user j,
ν1−βj
(
γ
cj
) γ(1−β)
1−αj−γ
r
(1−αj)(1−β)
1−αj−γ
j ≤ Fβ(p)(1− β),
which is equivalent to(
γ
cj
) γ
1−αj−γ
r
1−αj
1−αj−γ
j ≥ ν
−1
j
(
Fβ(p)(1− β)
) 1
1−β .
Adding these lower bounds and using the definition of νj ,
we find that
ρ(p) ≥
(
Fβ(p)(1− β)
) 1
1−β
n∑
j=1
1− αj
γ + αj − 1
.
C. FAIRNESS PROPERTIES
While the fairness functions (14) are the unique functions
satisfying certain desirable fairness axioms, other desirable
fairness properties are not axiomatically satisfied by these
functions. In this appendix, we consider two such properties:
envy-freeness and Pareto-efficnecy.
Definition 3. Envy-freeness holds if and only if no user
envies another user’s allocation. Mathematically, let rij de-
note the amount of resource i received by user j. User j can
then process maxi rij/Rij number of jobs. Envy-freeness is
defined as the property that maxi rij/Rij > maxi rik/Rij
for any j 6= k. In words, no other user’s allocation would
enable a user to process more jobs than her allocation would.
Definition 4. A function f is Pareto-efficient if, when-
ever x Pareto-dominates y (i.e., xi ≥ yi for each index i and
xj > yj for some j), f(x) > f(y).
We first show that envy-freeness always holds for an allo-
cation of utilities if users optimize the number of jobs that
they submit under bundled or resource pricing:
Proposition 7. Suppose that each user chooses a num-
ber of jobs to submit, x⋆j (rj (p)), so as to maximize her util-
ity function. Then for any given set of resource or bundled
prices p, if two users switch their corresponding resource al-
locations and are required to pay the difference in resources
received, neither gains any utility. If users do not need to
pay this difference, then a user may gain utility by switching
allocations.
Proof. The first part of the proposition is trivial, as for a
given set of prices, users are assumed to optimize the num-
ber of jobs processed. Since all users are charged at the
same per-resource or per-bundle rates, if switching resource
allocations alters the number of jobs processed for either,
neither gains any utility. If switching allocations results in
each user being able to process the same number of jobs,
then the users have either not changed their resource allo-
cations or have gained resources; in the latter case, their
utility decreases due to paying for extra resources that they
do not use to process jobs.
If users are not required to pay the difference in prices
from switching resource allocations, then one user may gain
utility by switching resource allocations with another: con-
sider, for instance, a user who processes a very small amount
of jobs, due to a low willingness to pay (e.g., a high value
of αj and low value of cj in (2)’s utility functions). Then
this user will process a higher number of jobs by switching
resources allocations with another user who is more willing
to pay for resources in exchange for processing jobs.
We next find that the fairness function (14) is Pareto-efficient
if β > 0 and |λ| ≥ 1/β − 1 [11, 12]. Thus, if the allocation
U j
(
x⋆j ,p
)
Pareto-dominates the allocation U j
(
x⋆j ,q
)
, then
the fairness function (15), for which λ = 1/β − 1, attains
a larger value under the prices p than it does under the
prices q. The prices here may represent those under any
pricing plan; bundled, resource, or differentiated. If Lemma
3 holds and the utility received from each user j is equal
to a price-independent constant multiplied by the amount
paid by user j, then the revenue (9) is also Pareto-efficient,
as it is an affine transformation of the sum of the utilities
received. This latter quantity corresponds to the fairness
(14) as λ→∞.
